Resilient Misbehaviour Detection MAC Protocol (MD-MAC) for Distributed Wireless Networks by Alocious, Chaminda et al.
Resilient Misbehaviour Detection MAC Protocol
(MD-MAC) for Distributed Wireless Networks
Chaminda Alocious
School of Computer Science
University of Hertfordshire
Hatfield, United Kingdom
Email: c.alocious@herts.ac.uk
Hannan Xiao
School of Computer Science
University of Hertfordshire
Hatfield, United Kingdom
Email: h.xiao@herts.ac.uk
Bruce Christianson
School of Computer Science
University of Hertfordshire,
United Kingdom
Email: b.christianson@herts.ac.uk
Abstract—Wireless network security requirements are becom-
ing more important and critical. The modern network security
architectures require more attention to provide security in each
network layer. This will require understanding of protocol vul-
nerabilities in existing protocol architectures. However, providing
security requirements are not just limited to confidentiality and
integrity, also availability and fairness are important security
elements. IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol is one of the most common
standard in modern day networks and has been designed without
a consideration for providing security protection at MAC layer.
IEEE 802.11 assumes all the nodes in the network are cooper-
ative. However, nodes may purposefully misbehave in order to
obtain extra bandwidth, conserve resources and disrupt network
performance. This research proposes a Misbehaviour Detection
MAC protocol (MD-MAC) to address the problematic scenarios
of MAC layer misbehaviours, which takes a novel approach to
detect misbehaviours in Mobile Adhoc Networks (MANETs). The
MD-MAC modifies the CSMA/CA protocol message exchange
and uses verifiable backoff value generation mechanism with
an incorporated trust model which is suitable for distributed
networks. The MD-MAC protocol has been implemented and
evaluated in ns2, simulation results suggest that the protocol is
able to detect misbehaving wireless nodes in a distributed network
environment.
Index Terms—Wireless Network Security, IEEE 802.11,
Medium Access Control, Misbehaviours
I. INTRODUCTION
There are many media access protocols for channel-access
control in wireless networks, for example the CSMA/CA
protocol for collision avoidance in wireless networks. IEEE
802.11 protocol is a most commonly used MAC protocol in
current wireless networks, based on CSMA/CA access control
mechanism. IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol assumes that all
the nodes in the wireless network adhere to the protocol,
and fully cooperate with the protocol. However, there are
selfish/malicious mobile stations which do not follow the IEEE
802.11 protocol rules when sharing wireless channel. Mobile
nodes in such distributed network have the motivation to be
selfish and conserve their resources. Additionally, due to the
vast enhancement of network device(Mobile Stations) adapters
programmability, changing MAC layer protocol parameters
has become easier.
This paper proposes a misbehaviour detection MAC pro-
tocol (MD-MAC) with the ability of detecting a range of
MAC layer misbehaviours. Firstly, MD-MAC introduces a
novel mechanism to verify CSMA/CA MAC protocol pa-
rameters (backoff/SIFS/DIFS/NAV) used in channel sharing
mechanism, and prevent selfish or malicious nodes from
misusing them. Such an assurance, primarily helps to build the
trustworthiness between nodes working together for a better
fair channel sharing operation. Secondly, this research uses
wireless nodes that are in the transmission range of both sender
and receiver (common neighbours) for the monitoring and
trust management purpose, and eventually for the detection
and diagnosis of MAC layer misbehaviours. MD-MAC could
be considered as a mechanism that builds a general security
platform in MAC layer for detecting and preventing misbe-
haviour nodes. In addition, the MD-MAC protocol does not
require wireless nodes to trust each other, therefore novel trust
model is suitable for distributed network architectures.
The rest of the paper is organized as below. Section II
explains the background for MAC layer misbehaviours and
operation of IEEE 802.11 protocol Distributed Coordination
Function (DCF). Section III demonstrates the proposed MD-
MAC protocol in details and section IV presents the simulation
topology and the protocol implementation details. Section V
presents the simulations and results analysis. Finally, section
VI concludes the paper and discusses future work.
II. IEEE 802.11 BASED WIRELESS NETWORKS MAC
LAYER MISBEHAVIOURS
Wireless networks are vulnerable to a vast range of MAC
layer misbehaviours due to its shared channel nature, dy-
namic topology changes, lack of centralized authority and
non-cooperativeness of the network nodes. Such features has
allowed MAC layer misbehaviours to be deployed successfully
on the devices running this standard protocol. In this section
the paper discuses IEEE 802.11 DCF related misbehaviours in
wireless networks and proposed detection/prevention mecha-
nisms in the literature.
A. IEEE 802.11 CSMA/CA with DCF
Most of the modern MAC protocols uses Distributed Coor-
dination Function (DCF) as the media access control mech-
anism. The CSMA/CA based DCF mechanism defines as,
all nodes in the wireless network share a common medium,
each node must wait for a randomly selected backoff value
before start transmitting the data packet. DCF uses the BEB
mechanism to assign backoff values to each wireless station
in the network, aiming to allow each station to get a fair share
of the wireless channel. Before a node transmit data, firstly
it senses the channel status. If the channel is busy it waits
for distributed inter frame space (DIFS) time, then the node
enters the Contention Window (CW) time scale where node
calculates the random backoff value within the range of (0,
CWmax-1).
Next, if the medium becomes idle after additional DIFS
time, the node starts to decrement backoff counter until the
channel becomes busy or counter reaches zero. If the channel
becomes busy before the counter becomes zero, then the node
freezes timer. This process continues until backoff counter
reaches zero. Then the node starts to send the first control
packet Request to Send (RTS), the receiver then responds after
a small inter frame space (SIFS) with a Clear to Send (CTS)
packet. After another SIFS time the sender transmits the DATA
packet. Finally, the receiver acknowledges the data by sending
an ACK packet. Occasionally, two nodes can reach zero in the
same time, in which case collision will happen and the node
has to recalculate the backoff values in the range of [0...2 *
CW min] [1] [2].
B. IEEE 802.11 MAC Protocol Misbehaviours
MAC Layer misbehaviours can be categorized as selfish,
malicious and inter layer. The selfish misbehaviours are tar-
geted to achieve unfair advantages of the network services
over the other legitimate wireless nodes. Such misbehaviours
mainly consist with backoff value, Differ Timers manipula-
tions (SIFS/DIFS/EIFS), CW cheating with altering the BEB
algorithm, CTS/RTS packet scrambling, Intentional RTS/CTS
packet drop, Network Allocation Vector (NAV) attacks and
cross flow attacks. Malicious misbehaviour attacks targeted to
disrupt the network services for legitimate nodes, which could
experience severe communication delays and higher collision
rates, also might not be able access the services at all. This
could also involve draining the battery life of good nodes, as
a result of continues retransmitting attempts. Malicious mis-
behaviours can be divided into link layer jamming, CTS/RTS
Time-out attacks and DOS attacks. The CTS/RTS Time-outs
attack based on manipulating SIFS differ timer value which
could affect surrounding neighbours to wait longer by setting
their NAV to a longer value. The neighbour nodes sets NAV
value each time its hear an RTS/CTS/DATA/ACK packet to
differ the channel busy duration in CSMA/CA mechanism.
MAC layer malicious nodes could be utilize to initialize inter-
layer attacks, especially in the routing layer (cross flow link
breakage), where misbehaviour node using CW window cheat-
ing to create routing layer link breakage by using different CW
values for varies route discovery process in protocol such as
DSR and AODV.
There has been many research to analyse MAC layer
misbehaviours in Wireless Networks. The research in [3] has
conducted an analysis of MAC layer DoS attacks in MANETs.
The authors have analysed both sender and receiver misbe-
haviours and concludes that misbehaving nodes can obtain
a larger throughput which significantly affect the network
performance, even capable of completely freeze the network
at higher rate attacks. In [4] they have analysed and simulated
the RTS/CTS DoS attack variants in 802.11 networks, which
is one type of low rate DoS attack that capable to exploit
the medium reservation mechanism of IEEE 802.11 through
duration field. Also, in [5] [6] [7] has conducted an evaluation
for greedy receiver misbehaviour in IEEE 802.11 Hotspots,
they have identified a range of greedy receiver misbehaviours,
and quantify their damage using both simulation and testbed
experiments.
In literature, most of researches have focussed to solve MAC
layer misbehaviour problem by modifying the existing IEEE
802.11 protocol’s CSMA/CA channel sharing mechanism. One
of the advantages of such detection and prevention system is
detection related components could be deployed with the stan-
dard protocol. Malicious nodes could generate smaller or non-
random backoff values which benefits to access the channel
more frequently. The research in [8] has addressed the issue
of generating smaller or non-random backoff in a centralized
network environment (WLAN). Their detection and prevention
method have proposed a modification to the standard IEEE
802.11 MAC protocol’s DCF by allowing the receiver to
generate and assigns back-off value to the sender. However,
this approach only capable to detect sender misbehaviours in a
trusted Access Point (AP) environment. The research done by
[5] demonstrates the weakness of such detection mechanisms
with the existence of malicious/misbehaving AP and discusses
potential prevention strategies.
The research work in Rodosavac et al. in [9] has proposed
a detection mechanism to overcome the weakness of previous
proposed method in [8]. This method apply misbehaviour
detection to more distributed networks and topologies. They
have utilized Ensuring Randomness Algorithm (ERA), cryp-
tographic functions to ensure the randomness of the values
agreed through a public discussion between sender and re-
ceiver. The research work in [10] has presented a predictable
random backoff algorithm to mitigate the effect of the smart
MAC layer misbehaviours.
III. PROPOSED MISBEHAVIOUR DETECTION MAC
(MD-MAC) PROTOCOL
The proposed MD-MAC could potentially applicable for
detection of MAC layer misbehaviours for higher availability
and fairness in distributed networks. In distributed wireless
network, nodes themselves have to monitor and control, rather
by any other centralized entities. The MD-MAC protocol has
diverted from standard protocol to use the common neighbours
(CN) to provide more flexibility in monitoring misbehaviours.
Common neighbour nodes are in the transmission range of
both sender and receiver; such nodes can monitor, report,
control packet communication between sender and receiver
for a given data transmission at MAC layer.
The MD-MAC protocol has modified the CSMA/CA mes-
sage exchange to detect misbehaving nodes which violate
backoff or differ timers (SIFS, DIFS, EIFS, NAV). In MD-
MAC protocol the sender generates a backoff value based on a
verifiable deterministic hash function with CSMA/CA RTS
control packet modification. In this verification procedure, the
neighbour nodes and receiver have the ability to verify the
sender generated backoff value used in CSMA/CA message
exchange. This verification and monitoring procedure includes
modification of the existing IEEE 802.11 protocol control
packets, such as RTS, CTS, DATA, and ACK. These control
packets have been modified to add more header fields. These
additional fields provide the ability to involve common neigh-
bours, and allow communication to be more transparent. The
Fig. 1 demonstrates the MD-MAC protocol message exchange
with the relevant additional header fields.
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Fig. 1. MD-MAC protocol with CSMA/CA in DCF Mode
A. MD-MAC Message Exchange with CSMA/CA Protocol
The MD-MAC protocol modifies the CSMA/CA message
exchange to accommodate the required elements to detect
and prevent MAC layer misbehaviours. The backoff value
generated by the sender is based on the properties of the
RTS packet bits header field (pktRTS.bits) and following
steps demonstrate the message exchange sequence in MD-
MAC with CSMA/CA.
1) In the Fig. 1 at point A, the sender generates the
expected backoff value (SndExp) from a deterministic
backoff value generating function (f ). The function f
is known by receivers and neighbour nodes, which will
be explained in the next section. A node to transmit
data, sends the RTS control packet with incorporated
(SndExp) value and the attempt number to the receiver.
Sender → Receiver: RTS(SndExp, Attempt)
2) The receiver receives the RTS packet at point B, then
the receiver extract the expected backoff value (SndExp)
and also monitors the actual waiting backoff time
(RecAct) using a monitoring function. The receiver also
verifies the expected backoff value by calculating the
backoff value (RecCal) using RTS bits header field
content and attempt number.
3) If the sender has not modified the RTS packet, then
RecCal and SndExp are equal. Then the receiver
attaches SndExp and RecAct to the CTS packet header
and sends to the sender.
Receiver → Sender: CTS(SndExp, RecAct)
4) Meanwhile at point B, the sender’s neighbours listen to
the RTS packet, they will extract the (SndExp) value
from the RTS and monitors actual waiting backoff time
(NbrAct) of the sender using a monitoring function. The
neighbour also verifies the accuracy of sender expected
backoff (SndExp) value by calculating the backoff value
(NbrCal) using a same deterministic function as the
sender.
5) In Fig.1 at point C time, the common neighbour hears
the CTS packet from the receiver and extract the RecAct
and SndExp values based on receiver’s observations.
6) After successful RTS/CTS exchange the sender sends
the DATA packet to the receiver
Sender → Receiver: DATA()
7) Finally, at point D the receiver calculates the penalty
value for the sender and append it to acknowledgement
packet header. The penalty value is generated in a
conservative manner by consulting common neighbours
trust values for a given sender. This penalty scheme will
be discussed with misbehaviour prevention mechanism
in the future work.
Reciever → Sender: ACK(penalty)
B. Verifiable Deterministic Backoff Value Generation
A verifiable hash function is used to generate backoff
values, which could verify backoff values from the receiver
and neighbour nodes. This deterministic hash function based
backoff value generation mechanism could prevent nodes from
fabricating a smaller backoff value, detect the nodes who
are not doubling the CW value after a collision and also to
detect sender-receiver collusion. In our research, we are using
Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC) of RTS control packets,
bits field as a common data segment. This CRC code will be
used to generate a hash value, then eventually generates the
deterministic backoff value. Equation (1) shows the CRC value
of the RTS packet, where pktRTS.bits() is the RTS packet
bit field.
crcRTS = CRCFunction(pktRTS.bits()) (1)
The CRC value helps to verify the backoff value and also
to minimize the overhead of the hash function in (2). After,
the CRC value generated, the equation in (2) shows how to
calculate the hash value. In this case if the hash value is h,
hash function uses the output of a deterministic function ”f”
which is shown in equation (3). This deterministic function
takes the CRC value, node id and attempt number to generate
a deterministic value. The CWmin is the node’s minimum
contention window value.
h = Hash(f(crcRTS, nodeid, attempt)) (2)
Where,
f = (ax+ c) ∗modCWmin (3)
And a =5; c = 2 * attempt+1; x = (CW * crcRTS + nodeid)
mod (CWmin + 1)
Finally, the hash function output in (2) utilize to compute
the final backoff value in equation (4).
backoff = h ∗mod2attempt−1 ∗ CWmin (4)
C. Trust Management with Common Neighbours/Receivers
Trust management is important in distributed networks as
there is no centralized authority for network security manage-
ment. Therefore, our research proposes a novel trust manage-
ment mechanism which utilizes the recorded communication
data in each neighbourhood. The equations (5) (6) demonstrate
the trust value (Ttv) calculations by the neighbour node.
Firstly, the neighbours calculates the misbehaviour factor (Mf)
based on (5).
In equation (5) the Mf is the ratio between the average
deviation (receiver reported deviation (RecAct−SndExp) and
neighbour’s observed deviation (NbrAct − SndExp)) backoff
slots to the sender’s expected backoff value (SndExp). This
will give a conservative value for calculating the final trust
value which starts with 100 % maximum value for all the
nodes, then consequently varies based on their behaviours
in every communication. Finally, the trust table is updated
by the common neighbour after every successful RTS/CTS
communication. The Table I shows the four statues which a
node could exist in the network based on their claimed trust
value. According to each node status, the prevention policies
could be applied to discourage the misbehaviours.
TABLE I
TRUST VALUE AND STATUES
TrustV alueRange NodeStatus
100 <= trust value => 80 NORMAL
79 <= trust value => 60 MISBEHAVING
59 <= trust value => 40 MISBEHAVED
39 <= trust value => 0 CRITICAL
Mf =
((RecAct − SndExp) + (NbrAct − SndExp))
2 ∗ SndExp (5)
Tv(%) = Tv − Tv ∗Mf (6)
IV. SIMULATION TOPOLOGY AND PROTOCOL
IMPLEMENTATION
The simulation topology has been designed to simulate MD-
MAC in the MANET environment with minimum required
entities of the network, topology and CBR traffic configuration
demonstrated in Table II. The simulated network topology
consists of a sender, receiver and two CN. The Fig. 2 shows the
network topology and implementation of MD-MAC entities
on each node. The receiver gets CBR traffic from two sources
(node 1 and node 3) at a bit rate of 2 kb/s and two CN hearing
the communications between sender and receiver.
Sender
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Common 
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Node id: 3
Common 
Neighbour
Node id: 2
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CBR Traffic Flow
Neighbour Monitor
Receiver Monitor: Monitoring 
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Fig. 2. MANET Network Topology in ns2
TABLE II
SIMULATION CONFIGURATION
Simulation Configuration
Network model ADHOC
Simulation area 1500x750 mxm
Routing protocol DSR
Simulation time 200 s
Total nodes/Misbehaving Nodes 4 / 1
Max moving speed 10 m/s
Average moving speed 3.82 m/s
CBR Traffic Configuration
Traffic type CBR
Packet size 512 bytes
Packet interval 0.25 S
Max no of packets 100000
V. SIMULATIONS RESULT ANALYSIS
The MD-MAC protocol, misbehaviours nodes have been
simulated in ns2 2.35 simulator. The main focus is to in-
vestigate whether the MD-MAC protocol has the ability to
detect sender’s backoff value manipulation. In this stage of
the research, we are not enforcing the misbehaviour nodes
with a penalty scheme. Therefore, MD-MAC only focuses on
monitoring and detecting misbehaviour nodes.
A. Trust Model Analysis
The following communication tables are extracted from the
simulation results, to demonstrate the nature of the monitor-
ing functionality in each distributed wireless network node.
There are two communication tables, the neighbour’s com-
munication table stores the RTS and CTS communications
sent by the senders and receivers, specifically communication
id (Id), sender id (Sndid), receiver id (Recid), neighbour
expected value (NbrExp), neighbour observed (NbrAct) and
receiver observed value (RecAct). The receiver’s commu-
nication table consists of sender id (Sndid), receiver ex-
pected backoff (RecExp), receiver monitored actual backoff
(RecAct), allowed backoff variance (Alwdvar) and actual
variance (ActV ar). The observed actual values are measured
with respect to an allowed variance, because the network
condition seen by the sender, receiver and neighbour might
be different.
The simulation result demonstrates in Table III provide the
ability to predict misbehaving nodes in every communication.
As an example the sender id 1 in table III shows continues
deviation (ActV ar) from the actual observed backoff value
(RecAct, NbrAct). Therefore, the neighbour diagnose node 1
as ”Misbehaving” after monitoring for a specific period of time
(MD-MAC specifies the detection monitoring window size as
a protocol parameter).
TABLE III
COMMON NEIGHBOUR’S COMMUNICATION TABLE
Id Sndid RecId NbrExp NbrAct RecAct AlwdV ar ActV ar
1 1 0 459 681 660 45 222
2 3 0 607 593 593 60 14
3 1 0 348 435 406 34 87
4 3 0 552 572 572 55 20
5 1 0 239 321 311 23 82
TABLE IV
RECEIVER’S COMMUNICATION TABLE
Id SendId RecExp RecAct AllowedV ar ActualV ar
1 1 459 660 45 201
2 3 607 593 60 13
3 1 348 406 34 58
4 3 552 572 55 13
5 1 239 311 23 72
B. Sender Misbehaviour Detection
The misbehaving senders selects small backoff values in-
stead of random values, or ignore to increment the attempt
number after a collision. In this case node id (1) in the Fig. 2 is
misbehaving by waiting a smaller backoff value than it should
have. This misbehaviour has been configured as a sender
misbehaviour percentage (SMP). Therefore, the sender id (1) is
violating backoff value by reducing the waiting time by SMP.
As an example, if the SMP is 40% then the misbehaving sender
will only wait for 60% of the allocated backoff value slots.
According to the Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, MD-MAC is capable of
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Fig. 3. Backoff values of a well-behaved sender, monitored by a good receiver
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Fig. 4. Backoff values of a misbehaving sender, monitored by a good receiver
detecting sender misbehaviours with a higher accuracy by the
receiver. The result shows that, good nodes have shown a small
variance to the expected backoff value while the misbehaviour
nodes have a higher variance between observed and actual
backoff values.
C. Receiver Misbehaviour Detection
In MANETs receivers can be non-cooperative, greedy or
malicious intended nodes could misbehave by reporting wrong
observation value and favour some selected senders (colluded
sender-receiver). In this misbehaviour model the receiver is
cheating by not reporting the correct observed backoff value
of the sender. However, in MD-MAC the neighbour is still
capable of detecting such misbehaviour as shown in Fig.5 and
Fig.6 irrespective of receiver’s collaboration. In this case the
receiver trust value will be decreased for not reporting correct
observed backoff value. The Fig.7 shows the trust value distri-
bution which was calculated by a common neighbour. The trust
value of a well behaved nodes is higher and maintained a good
trust level in the network, however misbehaving node having
a lower trust value (CRITICAL or MISBEHAVED status)
throughout the monitored time period. In Fig.7 occasionally
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Fig. 5. Backoff values of a good sender and receiver, monitored by a common
neighbour
1 4 7 10 14 18 22 26 30 34 38 42 46 50 54 58 62 66 70 74 78 82 86 90 94 98
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
750
800
850
900
950
1000
1050
RTS Communication Count
B
ac
ko
ff 
V
al
ue
Misbehaving Node Expected Backoff
Misbehaving Node Actual Backoff
Fig. 6. Backoff values of a misbehaving sender, monitored by a common
neighbour
trust value could suddenly increase to higher values from lower
values due to varies network condition. However, the MD-
MAC computes trust value over a period of time considering
the general behaviour of the node. These trust values could
be utilized in the detection and prevention mechanism or even
across the layers.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This research proposed a novel MAC layer misbehaviour
detection protocol. The MD-MAC protocol detects complex
node misbehaviours in MANETs using verifiable backoff value
generation mechanism with an incorporated trust model that
is suitable for distributed networks. The protocol has modified
CSMA/CA control packet exchange mechanism to incorporate
common neighbours for monitoring. The result suggests that
MD-MAC has been able to detect complicated misbehaviours
in MAC layer with higher accuracy without trusting any of
the communication parties. The proposed model accuracy
must be compared with other detection approaches which
will be carried out in future work. MD-MAC protocol can
be easily adapted to detect other type of MAC layer related
misbehaviours with generic and distributed model. MD-MAC
could be configured to monitor any protocol parameters such
as SIFS/DIFS/NAV. Also, as a future improvements MD-MAC
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Fig. 7. Common neighbour maintained the trust value of a well-behaved and
misbehaving sender node
could choose a most trusted neighbour on that node cluster,
which can be used for other network layers to get information
about MAC layer misbehaviours, which enhance the cross
layer collaboration and allow the upper layer detection mech-
anisms to be more proactive.
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